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Abstract
Since the end of the cold war, the world of politics and international relations has seen China
grow its power and influence tremendously. Much of this growth has been fueled by strategies
and initiatives focused on smart power, a term coined by Joseph Nye in 2003,1 through large
economic projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Meanwhile, the backbone of the
United States smart power is within institutions, most notably the United Nations (UN), which
have begun to show their age and weaknesses. 1) Should smart power strategies be known as
stronger power building initiatives than hard power strategies? 2) How much does the US and
China's current international strategies for power rely on smart power vs hard or soft power
initiatives? This paper will address these questions with an increased focus and awareness on the
legacy of the Trump administration and existence of the Belt and Road Initiative.
To properly answer these questions, this paper embarks on a multi-step process. First, critical
theory is utilized to question academia’s accepted definitions of smart power and to better
understand the real benefits of hard power in a contemporary world. From this questioning, this
paper presents a new more detailed and, perhaps, de-mystified definition of smart power. Next,
this paper explores the benefits of smart power compared to hard power. Analyzing how hard
powers, especially more traditional ones, operate in a contemporary context is an important
aspect of this section. Then this paper analyzes what types of power the US and China’s
international power strategies have relied on. This section continues in its use of critical theory to
question common narratives, most notably that surrounding which power is most important to
the US.

1

Nye, Joseph S. "Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power." Foreign Affairs, 88, no. 4 (2009)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20699631, 160.
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Introduction
Through the current international system of governance, political power is “the capacity of
persons or collectivities ‘to get things done’ effectively, in particular when their goals are
obstructed by some kind of human resistance or opposition,”2 and is key to successfully pushing
forth an international political agenda. There are many ways to create and exercise power. One
of the most common categorization strategies breaks down different concepts of power into three
types: hard power, soft power, and, more recently, smart power. Recognizing how various states
utilize and value different forms of power is vital to understanding the current structures of
international organizations and their futures. This paper looks into the argument that hard power
strategies are quickly becoming outdated and overemphasized. In regard to power in general, it is
no secret that the world has been leaving behind the more traditional interaction of warfare
between two state actors. Increasing fear of economic backlash, new technologies, and increased
dependence on other states play a major part in this. Additionally, this paper discusses how smart
many smart power strategies have been implemented after World War II (WWII) and have, until
recently perhaps, been undervalued.
This is a major factor leading towards the creation of this paper’s research question and
the importance of the use of critical theory as a theoretical framework.3 With experts placing a
high level of importance on soft power strategies4 and other experts, such as Kaufman,5 placing

2

Parsons, Talcott. "On the Concept of Political Power." Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 107, no.
3 (1963): http://www.jstor.org/stable/985582, 232.
3
More on the importance of the paper can be found within the Literature Review section and more information for
critical Theory can be found within the Theoretical Framework section.
4
James Helicke, “Skidmore Faculty Offer Global Perspectives on the United States,” Skidmore College, March 31,
2021, https://www.skidmore.edu/news/2021/0331-aftershock-panel.php.
5
Crowley, P.J., Kaufman, Robert, Oliker, Olga, Wang, Jay, panelists. Panel Discussion: “Does Soft Power Really
Matter?” A CPD-BBC Forum. Pesented at the University of Southern California October 2, 2014.
https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/sites/uscpublicdiplomacy.org/files/useruploads/u39301/Does%20Soft%20Power%20
Really%20Matter%20-%20CPD-BBC%20Forum.pdf, 6.
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the importance on hard power strategies for the US, this paper aims to tackle the questions: 1)
Should smart power strategies be known as stronger power building initiatives than hard power
strategies? 2) How much does the US and China's current international strategies for power rely
on smart power vs hard or soft power initiatives? While these experts are surely not entirely
wrong on the importance of soft power to the US, this paper will explore the hypothesis that
experts throughout the country regularly undervalue smart power organizations, in particular the
UN, and how these organizations may be the main enabler of US power projection around the
world, not soft or hard power resources. Interviews with Pushkala Prasad, a professor of
management at Skidmore College and Mahesh Shankar, the director of the international affairs
program at Skidmore, show how the world is becoming ever more bi-lateral,6 7 focusing on these
two states strategies is vital in understanding and preparing for the future.
To best answer this question the paper will seek to more clearly state the definition for
what power is as well as an adequate definition of soft and hard power. From research and
interviews it has become apparent that smart power is not only underdeveloped in academia but
also lacks a proper definition.8 Within the critical analysis section, this paper will critique the
most common definitions of smart power and suggest a more suitable definition. Further, this
paper will go into the importance of states’ soft and hard power initiatives throughout the world
and compare them to their smart power initiatives. Focusing on the impact of the Trump
Administration and the sheer size of China’s Belt and Road initiative will be important to better
understanding how the US and China create power.

6

Prasad, Pushkala. Prasad Interview on Hard, Soft and Smart power between the US and China. Personal, April 18,
2021.
7
Shankar, Mahesh. Shankar Interview on Hard, Soft and Smart power between the US and China. Personal, April
12, 2021.
8
Shankar, Mahesh. Shankar Interview on Hard, Soft and Smart power between the US and China.
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Positionality
I am a Skidmore College Undergraduate majoring in International Affairs and minoring in
Management & Business. I was born and raised in the United States and have not visited China. I
consider myself to have a focus and passion in conflict resolution and multilateral diplomacy.
Most recently, this has led me to take great interest in the rapid rise of China’s political
capabilities. I have therefore written this paper to get a better understanding of how that rise is
occurring and why the United States is beginning to lag behind many of China’s international
initiatives.

Literature Review
Throughout the world political power and understanding how it is wielded has been a
research topic that has undergone much scrutiny. Expectedly, many papers, books, interviews,
and more have been developed regarding the definition of political power and the different types
of strategies that can be used to build it. The three main strategies this paper will rely on are soft
power, hard power, and smart power.
First, it is important to understand what the definition of power is. People define power and
its various types very differently. The main definition of power this paper will be utilizing is
found within The Powers to Lead by Joseph Nye and is the idea that power, at its core, is the
ability to create your own outcomes.9 This is an essential term to define as it is the basis of soft,
hard, and smart power. Expectedly, others go further than Nye’s definition. For instance, in
Parson’s “On the Concept of Political Power” political power is defined as “the capacity of
persons or collectivities ‘to get things done’ effectively, in particular when their goals are

9

Joseph Nye, The Powers to Lead. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2010.), 27-28.
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obstructed by some kind of human resistance or opposition,”10 Parson’s definition expands on
Nye’s and gives insight into the idea of “persons or collectives.”11 Meanwhile, the RAND
Company, a non-profit research firm, defines state power as “(1) resources or capabilities, or
power-in-being; (2) how that power is converted through national processes; (3) and power in
outcomes, or which state prevails in particular circumstances.”12 For this paper, it is important to
focus on Parson’s idea of the ‘collective’ as this paper discusses state goals, not necessarily
individuals’ desires.
Throughout my research I found many definitions of power and they were all based on
relatively similar thoughts and produced similar descriptions. Measuring power, however, is a
much more complicated issue. Different researchers and organizations pick a plethora of
different categories and even utilize different methods for measuring the same category. The
RAND Corporation utilizes eight categories in “Measuring National Power”: Domestic
Sociopolitical, International Political, Population, Economic, Agriculture, Energy, Technology,
and Environment Resources and Quality.13 However, the calculations vary greatly. Beckley goes
against the method of measuring power through “gross indicators” similar to what RAND
utilizes as they “they are logically unsound and empirically unreliable, severely
mischaracterizing the balance of power in numerous cases, including in some of the most
consequential geopolitical events in modern history.”14 Instead of gross indicators Beckley
argues for the use of “net indicators” that take into account both liabilities and the assets of a

Parsons, “On the Concept of Political Power,” 232.
Parsons, “On the Concept of Political Power,” 232.
12
Gregory Treverton and Seth G. Jones. Measuring National Power. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2005, IX
13
Gregory Treverton and Seth G. Jones. Measuring National Power, X
14
Michael Beckley. “The Power of Nations: Measuring What Matters,” International Security, 43, no. 2 (2018):
https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00328, 9.
10
11
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state.15 Measuring power is an extraordinarily complicated issue. To properly do so the
utilization of quantitative and a wide view of qualitative data is necessary.
What then is soft power? Nye has become an authority regularly turned to for defining soft,
hard and smart power. Within one of his articles, simply titled “Soft Power,” Nye defines soft
power as the ability for “one country [to] get other countries to want what it wants.”16 Of
importance here, the other countries must freely desire aspects of what another state has. The use
of coercion is generally not associated with soft power and is more so reserved for hard power.
Instead, it is seen as the power of attraction. Prime cases of soft powers for the US are examples
that create a desire for another state to want an aspect of a different state, these could be
democracy, ‘freedom,’ and human rights.17 These examples are recognized and discussed around
the world and create a generally positive view for the US. This power takes a long time to build
but can be cheaper to maintain than other forms of power. There are, however, those that look
towards ‘rethinking’ Nye’s conceptualization of soft power. For example, Rothman disagrees
with Nye’s clear distinction between hard and soft power and instead sees it being more of a
scale. Within his article entitled “Revising the soft power concept: what are the means and
mechanisms of soft power?,” Rothman utilizes a chart, seen in Figure #1, that explains the flow
of power between hard and soft. This chart however, and Rothmans thought process, I would
argue, is flawed as it ignores the existence of smart power – in fact, he does not mention it once.
I have found this to be a common theme within academia, to ignore or altogether set aside smart
power. This is an area I will explore more throughout the paper.

Beckley, “The Power of Nations: Measuring What Matters,” 9-10.
Joseph S. Nye. "Soft Power." Foreign Policy, no. 80 (1990). doi:10.2307/1148580, 155.
17
Laura Roselle, Alister Miskimmon, and Ben O’Loughlin. “Strategic Narrative: A New Means to Understand Soft
Power.” Media, War & Conflict, 7, no. 1 (April 2014): https://doi.org/10.1177/1750635213516696, 72.
15
16
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Alternatively, hard power is really the power of coercion as described in many papers such as
“Security and Smart Power” by Nye.18 And, within “Propaganda Isn’t the Way: Soft Power”,
Nye defines hard power as “the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military
might to make others follow your will.”19 This distinction with hard power being the power of
coercion and soft power being the power of attraction become central to the understanding of
what smart power is. Prime examples of hard power are economic sanctions and military
actions.20 Hard power resources are generally expensive to maintain but are much faster to create
than soft power.21 Additionally, in an interview, Shankar agreed that many traditional physical
hard power resources are outdated and, while they are built for use in war, many of them may
never see action;22 instead, cyber tools and unmanned aircraft may by a better investment.23
Critiques of hard power, especially on Nye’s more realist view of the world, can be found
throughout different writings. The most common critique can be seen in Bilgin and Elis’s “Hard
Power, Soft Power: Toward a More Realistic Power Analysis.” They state how realist views on
hard power are conceived as “unrealistic insofar as it over-privileges material forms of power
and focuses on the visible dimensions of power relations to the neglect of the multiple processes
through which power is produced and expressed.”24 The paper directly cites Nye’s version of
soft power as not offering “a theory of power that reflects upon its own moment(s) and site(s) of
production and expression.”25 Nye however may argue that smart power is the term that he has

Joseph S. Nye. “Security and Smart Power.” American Behavioral Scientist, 51, no. 9 (May 2008):
https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764208316228. 1352.
19
Joseph S. Nye. "Propaganda Isn't the Way: Soft Power." International Herald Tribune, January 10, 2003.
20
Nye, “Security and Smart Power,” 1352.
21
Nye, “Propaganda Isn't the Way: Soft Power.”
22
Shankar, Mahesh. Shankar Interview on Hard, Soft and Smart power between the US and China, 7:12.
23
Prasad, Anushman. “US Presence in the Middle East.” Lecture, April 14, 2021.
24
“Bilgin, Pinar, and Berivan Elis. "Hard Power, Soft Power: Toward a More Realistic Power Analysis." Insight
Turkey 10, no. 2 (2008): http://www.jstor.org/stable/26328671, 5.
25
Bilgin and Pinar, “Hard Power, Soft Power: Toward a More Realistic Power Analysis.” 5.
18

10

coined to combat these positions. Indeed, this may be an example of how smart power is
regularly left out of academia and the literature.
What then exactly is smart power? This power was coined later than soft and hard power by
Nye. Nye’s main definition of smart power is fairly simple and, in my opinion, too much so.
Within “Security and Smart Power” he defines it as “a strategy that combines the soft power of
attraction with the hard power of coercion.”26 A more detailed definition can be found by the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) which goes as follows: “an approach
that[…] invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions of all levels to expand[…]
influence and establish legitimacy of[…] action.”27 This definition further explains the
combination of hard and soft power resources and, interestingly, was at least in part, written in a
report co-authored by Nye. Most importantly, one should appreciate that smart power is not
necessarily a power of coercion or directly a power of attraction. Other actors are not forced to
join smart power programs, however they may be manipulated into it. The nuance between
attraction, manipulation, and coercion is small and relatively undiscussed in the literature. In
fact, I could not find an example of any literature referring to and defining smart power as the
power of manipulation; even though when I asked, Nye agreed that aspects of smart power do
involve manipulation, with his response seeming to combine soft and hard power to facilitate
manipulate.28
With smart power lacking a regularly agreed upon definition and interviewees agreeing that
it is under researched in academia, section VII will spend more time discussing the primary

Nye. “Security and Smart Power,” 1353.
Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye. CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America.
(Washington, D.C., Maryland: CSIS Press, 2007), 7.
28
Joseph Nye, Email regarding smart power questions, Personal, March 18, 2021.
26
27
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research done into creating a more clear and precise definition for smart power.29 Prime
examples of smart power throughout the world today are the United Nations30 and the Belt and
Road Initiative.31 These are both good examples of soft power because they utilize and create
desire from other states to have what another state has, as well as maintain the ability to create
outcomes desired from the leaders of these projects. The Belt and Road initiative not only
utilizes both hard and soft power for “the provision of public goods in the international
system,”32 it also creates desires from other states to want economic success similar to China
while also providing China with a system hand crafted to create the best outcomes for itself. The
case with the United Nations is very similar: it effectively set up rules and guidelines for the
whole world that were created to benefit the United States. Additionally, its “true strength[…]
still lies in the norms embedded in its charter-values that greatly benefit the United States if
pursued objectively.”33
One critique to Nye’s idea of smart power, that is the combination of both hard and soft
power resources, comes from Cammack in “Smart Power and US Leadership.” Cammack
disagrees with Nye’s “uncompromisingly realist framework” and argues that Nye is out of touch
with contemporary international politics.34 Cammick continues to argue that Nye’s outlook and
belief in the pre-eminence of the United States is wrong and that Nye puts too much stock in

29

To expand, as this is a literature review and should simply be a section reviewing already published sources, I will
explain smart power in greater detail further in the paper where the use of primary sources is more appropriate.
30
Johanna Forman. “Investing in a New Multilateralism: A smart power approach to the United Nations.” CSIS.
January, 2009. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/090128_mendelsonforman_un_smartpower_web.pdf, 1-2.
31
Mustafa YAĞCI. "Rethinking Soft Power in Light of China's Belt and Road Initiative." Uluslararası İlişkiler
/International Relations 15, no. 57 (2018): https://www.jstor.org/stable/26604994, 69.
32
YAĞCI “Rethinking Soft Power in Light of China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” 69.
33
Forman, “Investing in a New Multilateralism: A smart power approach to the United Nations,” 1-2.
34
Paul Cammack, “Smart Power and US Leadership: A Critique of Joseph Nye”, 49th Parallel, Vol. 22 (2008),
https://fortyninthparalleljournal.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/1-cammack-smart-power.pdf, 6-9.
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American soft power capabilities that Cammick defines as “in crisis.”35 Throughout this paper
Cammick attacks Nye in many ways and depicts his views as “ironic,”36 “bland,”37 and “illfounded”38 among many other descriptors. What Nye considers successful US international
smart power, Cammick, throughout the paper, completely disagrees with and argues that US
power is essentially in shambles. Important to note, many consider initiatives that are hard power
but create soft power or vice versa as a smart power. An example of this is seen within “Smart
Power” by Coutu, who utilizes an example of America sending ships to Japan in an effort that
she described was to exemplify a “soft power symbol.”39 Nye may disagree with this as he
defines smart power as the “combination[…] of both hard and soft power.”40 Perhaps this is
semantics, but this is a subtle yet clear distinction between Coutu’s idea of smart power that can
rely on one power creating another, while Nye may argue that smart power is when both powers
are utilized together.
One of the major aspects to this paper is understanding the Belt and Road Initiative and how
it plays into China increasing its political power around the world. First, much of my primary
work involves the understanding of how strong a relationship China is creating with other states
through the BRI. This primary research will be discussed later in the Critical Analysis section.
Huang classifies what the BRI is in three themes. First, he points towards the BRI as being
China’s strategy to “sustain economic growth” to similar levels that it has been experiencing
over the last couple decades.41 Some strategies that are being applied are the large spread

Cammack, “Smart Power and US Leadership, A Critique of Joseph Nye” 15.
Cammack, “Smart Power and US Leadership, A Critique of Joseph Nye” 15.
37
Cammack, “Smart Power and US Leadership, A Critique of Joseph Nye” 13.
38
Cammack, “Smart Power and US Leadership A Critique of Joseph Nye,” 15.
39
Diane Coutu, “Smart Power.” Harvard Business Review, August 1, 2014.
40
Nye, “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power,” 160.
41
Huang, Yiping. "Understanding China's Belt & Road Initiative: Motivation, framework and assessment," China
Economic Review, September, 2016, vol. 40, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chieco.2016.07.007, 315.
35
36
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creation of oil and gas pipelines, shipping routes, high speed railways, telecommunication
infrastructure development, and the building of roads.42 Figure #2 shows a well detailed
explanation and mapping of the economic plans China has for the BRI. Second, he describes
how China plans to use utilize the BRI as a means of “assert[ing] greater international
influence.”43 What exactly this means is still fairly contested as China is a very secretive country
and some, such as Prasad44, point out how there is not necessarily evidence to back up China’s
claims regarding the “win-win” situation it says it is creating.45 46 Huang expands on this point
by explaining the potential for China to take on a role of “active participation in the international
economic architecture” of the world; with the creation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB) (essentially an Asian version of the World Bank or International Monetary Fund
(IMF)) as the beginning of this process.47 What further long-term large institutional changes
China wishes to make in the future, however, are still unknown.48 Lastly, Huang points towards
the BRI’s aims at infrastructure development around the world. This goal deeply supports
China’s first initiative of economic development as China has lent billions of dollars to states
that regularly utilize Chinese companies to then build the infrastructure.
Huang also points to China’s support of infrastructure as an initiative to “foster regional
cooperation and development.”49 Un-noted by Huang are some of the important rules that come
with accepting money from China. Most importantly, Shirk explains in her book China: Fragile

Huang, “Understanding China's Belt & Road Initiative: Motivation, framework, and assessment,” 315.
Huang, “Understanding China's Belt & Road Initiative: Motivation, framework, and assessment,” 315.
44
Prasad, Pushkala. Prasad Interview on Hard, Soft and Smart power between the US and China, 5:25.
45
Yi, Wang. “Build a New Type of International Relations Featuring Win-Win Cooperation.” Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, July 1, 2016.
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/wjbz_663308/2461_663310/t1376908.shtml.
46
More on this in the Critical Analysis section.
47
Huang, “Understanding China's Belt & Road Initiative: Motivation, framework, and assessment,” 318.
48
Huang, “Understanding China's Belt & Road Initiative: Motivation, framework, and assessment,” 318.
49
Huang, “Understanding China's Belt & Road Initiative: Motivation, framework, and assessment,” 315.
42
43
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Superpower how “Chinese investment in developing countries have one condition: acceptance of
the “one-China” policy that requires recipient governments to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan
and recognize Taiwan as part of China’s sovereign territory.”50 This is of extraordinary
importance as it opens the door into concerning strategies that China is employing throughout the
world, potentially furthering imperialist strategies. For instance, China has been accused of
“using debt to gain geopolitical leverage by trapping poor countries in unsustainable loans” a
process now known as ‘debt trap diplomacy.’51 One of the most notable results of these debt
traps have seen Sri Lanka being forced to sign a 99-year lease for one of its ports to China.52
Adding important insight, in an interview, Emmanuel Balogun, a professor of political science at
Skidmore College, was more hesitant than Shankar and Prasad on the BRI’s complete correlation
to imperialism. He mentioned how states who join the BRI are doing so by their own sovereign
will.53 An article by Were suggests a similar notion that those supporting “the debt trap narrative
underestimates the decision-making power of African governments.”54 Only the future will tell if
China utilizes these strategies imperialistically on a larger scale or holds true to its word of
creating “a new type of international relations featuring win-win cooperation.”
While Huang’s three points may paint the picture of the BRI being a well thought out and
detailed plan, the reality is actually quite different. At least from the international communities’
perspective, there is much confusion and a lack of clarity as to exactly which projects, especially

50

Susan Shirk, China: The Fragile Superpower. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) 3.
Anzetse Were, “Debt Trap? Chinese Loans and Africa's Development Options.” South African Journal of
International Affairs, no. 66 (August 2018):
https://media.africaportal.org/documents/sai_spi_66_were_20190910.pdf, 1.
52
Abi-habib, Maria. “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port.” The New York Times, June 25, 2018.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html.
53
Balogun, Emmanuel. Balogun Interview on Hard, Soft and Smart power between the US and China. Personal,
March 31st, 2021.
54
Were, “Debt Trap? Chinese Loans and Africa's Development Options,” 1.
51
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from Chinese companies, are part of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) plan or if a master
plan even exists.55 56 In actuality, the CCP “has never provided an official definition of what
constitutes a BRI project, nor has it issued a list of approved BRI participants.”57 While it is
possible the Chinese government knows exactly what projects are part of the BRI it seems
dubious that they have a completed plan for every economic project that is actually part of the
BRI, an issue that has been exacerbated for me by the thin and often blurred lines between
private and state owned companies in China. Lastly, through the BRI and a “community of states
that have common interest” China is pushing forth goals for its currency use throughout the
world.58 Essentially, by utilizing the yuan as the primary currency in loans and economic
projects, China looks to realize it’s goal of “internationaliz[ing] the yuan.”59 Along these lines,
China has also been using the yuan in transactions for oil with many countries and Matthews
believes Saudi Arabia will be “induced to follow suit, ensuring that a significant proportion of
global trade in oil is conducted not in the US dollar but in Chinese yuan.”60 This has massive
implications for the United States as the dollar being the primary use of international transaction
has given it immense power.61 Removing that and giving it to China places the US in a much
different position. As the article discusses, this may be a prime example of smart power
strategies.

Ang, Yuen, “Demystifying Belt and Road.” Foreign Affairs, June 20, 2019.
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-05-22/demystifying-belt-and-road.
56
Balogun, Emmanuel. Balogun Interview on Hard, Soft and Smart power between the US and China, 2021.
57
Ang, “Demystifying Belt and Road.”
58
John Matthews. “China’s Long Term Trade and Currency Goals: The Belt & Road Initiative.” The Asia-Pacific
Journal, 5, 17, no. 1 (January 1, 2019): https://apjjf.org/2019/01/Mathews.html, 1.
59
Matthews, “China’s Long Term Trade and Currency Goals: The Belt & Road Initiative,” 12.
60
Matthews, “China’s Long Term Trade and Currency Goals: The Belt & Road Initiative,” 12.
61
Matthews, “China’s Long Term Trade and Currency Goals: The Belt & Road Initiative,” 5-7.
55
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Overall, this paper uses a wide variety of sources to best explain certain terms, understand
complex initiatives, question pervasive ways of understanding power today, and create a
potential outlook at the future. It is clear from analyzing many articles, as well as confirmed in
interviews, that smart power maintains an absence of a clear definition and path in academia.
This paper will attempt to fill the gaps in literature that are present on smart power while
answering the research questions 1) Should smart power strategies be known as stronger power
building initiatives than hard power strategies? 2) How much does the US and China's current
international strategies for power rely on smart power vs hard or soft power initiatives? This
paper will answer these questions with an increased focus and awareness of the legacy of the
Trump administration and existence of the Belt and Road Initiative. The topic and contention of
power between the United States and China is truly reaching a peak and understanding how these
states are continuing to utilize soft and hard power strategies or changing to use smart power
strategies is vital. Many aspects of life are impacted by these states, and their relationship.
Whether it be clear political and economic aspects such as the BRI and international diplomacy
or lesser obviously effected aspects such as physical effects to the world from construction
projects or cultural changes from an increase in Chinese tourism.

Theoretical Framework
For this paper I have decided to utilize critical theory as my research’s theoretical
framework. Pulling from Prasad’s book Crafting Qualitative Research: Beyond Positivist
Traditions critical theory is regularly used for researchers studying “ongoing situations and
events.”62 This clearly applies to my research, as the issue of smart power strategies is happening

62

Pushkala Prasad, Crafting Qualitative Research: beyond Positivist Traditions. (New York, NY: Routledge, 2018),
168.
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currently. Continuing from Prasad, critical theory is a “tradition of social inquiry”63 and critical
theorists can aim to critique “hegemonic” processes of thought and “pursue thoughtful and
sustained critiques of […] professional mindsets.”64 This is important as much of the research I
performed has followed this ideology; the belief that much of academic articles readily
underutilize smart power due to a multitude of reasons. In addition, I oppose one of the most
accepted definitions of smart power from Nye and attempt to offer a newer, less vague, version.
In essence, critical theory enables me to write a paper that answers the research questions at hand
while simultaneously tackling issues within the related political science community along the
way.

Methods
This paper will heavily rely on the use of discourse analysis to determine if and how China
and the United States are utilizing more smart power in today’s world. I have performed multiple
interviews with experts in the field of international relations that will be critically analyzed to
support a wide range of topics covered throughout the Critical Analysis section. Additionally, I
have collected speeches as well as press releases from coveted government officials and
institutions in the United States and China to understand messaging around certain issues.
Furthermore, understanding that these speeches and press releases simply represent the
frontstage of the United States and China’s strategies. This means taking these statements with a
‘grain of salt’ is necessary. Important to note, the case of understanding front vs backstage
strategy is even more true for China and was a note from two interviewees. Lastly, I also utilize
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newspaper articles as a primary source and material to collect information regarding what
different areas of the world are thinking regarding certain international events and trajectories.

Critical Analysis
With a clear understanding of hard and soft power established in literature, the lack of clarity
for smart power became evident. First, this paper is going to establish and begin to legitimize a
more detailed definition of smart power and clarify what smart power is not. Nye’s definition,
the combination of hard and soft power resources65, is broad and leaves many questions
remaining. Other definitions, however, rely too heavily on hard or soft power resources. This can
be seen in the CSIS’s definition which states: "an approach that underscores the necessity of a
strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions of all levels to
expand one's influence and establish legitimacy of one's action.”66 This definition slips in its
reliance on military expenditures. In reflection to Nye’s definition of hard power we know that
factors such as economic sanctions can be considered as such, however in this definition they
seem to have no place. Differently than his definitions of soft and hard power, Nye neglected to
include a comparable one-word summary for smart power as there is for soft power (i.e.,
attraction) or for hard power (i.e., coercion). This is where I will begin the process of creating a
more apt definition of smart power.
In a short email correspondence with Nye, I asked him what his thoughts were on looking
at smart power as the power of “manipulation”.67 To this he replied “Yes,[…] the coercive[…]
aspects definitely involve manipulation.”68 During an interview, Shankar and Prasad both agreed
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with this new idea of analyzing smart power as the power of manipulation.69 70 The difference
between coercion and manipulation is small and important. Coercion, especially in the use of
hard powers, is utilized to push forth the concept that other actors do not have any say in the use
of a certain tactic or initiative. Meanwhile, manipulation enables the understanding that one actor
creates a situation that still relies on another actor utilizing their own free will to join in on an
initiative. This is the first idea this paper relies on for a clearer understanding of smart power.
Secondly, looking at Nye’s definition of smart power, “the combination of hard and soft power
resources,” he puts equal weight on the role of soft and hard power. I would argue that, in
actuality, soft power has much less of a role to play than hard powers in smart power initiatives.
This is important and a major reason why this paper focuses on comparing hard and smart power
instead of all three powers together.
With our understanding of soft power as “one country’s [ability to] get other countries to
want what it wants.”71 it becomes clearer why smart power initiatives do not actually rely on soft
power. Instead, smart power initiatives are created from one state’s need of access to another
state’s resources. These resources can range from influence to raw materials. The state using
smart power strategies is not relying on soft power tactics and it is not slowly using societal
aspects as a reason to get other states to be more like itself. It is, instead, attempting to
manipulate other states to join an initiative and better itself over all others. With these factors in
mind, and utilizing parts of other definitions stated above, this paper proposes a new definition
for smart power: “An approach to international power building initiatives that looks to bolster
and create new institutions aimed at expanding access to resources through the inclusion and
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utilization of other states and their own resources.” This definition elucidates a clearer
understanding of what a smart power initiative is. Unlike Nye’s definition, which only works if
readers previously understand what soft and hard powers are, this definition creates a demystification of smart power and enables a much wider selection of individuals who are
interested to more readily understand the concept, an important aspect of critical theory.72
Additionally, it fixes the over-reliance on soft power that Nye, and much of the literature,
attributes to smart power. With this definition, while soft powers can be used as an important
part of convincing others to join an initiative, they are not equally as necessary as hard power
resources. Here, hard power resources, especially those that are ‘coercive’ such as money, end up
being a more important factor to building these new smart initiatives. Importantly, smart power
initiatives have a large possibility of enhancing the states soft power capabilities. For instance,
the impact of the new initiative may create a narrative that the state has increased its diplomatic
ability or, looking at the BRI, the state is given recognition for its support in enhancing another
states society. This increased soft power could then be used for in making future smart powers,
but I believe is not necessary.
One modern phenomenon that improperly utilizes the term ‘smart power,’ that I believe is
important to correct is, is the connection of Hillary Clinton’s strategies with her own version of
smart power.73 74 Anshuman Prasad75, in a guest lecture, attributes the reasoning for her
strategies being described as “smart” to the fact that they are based heavily around the use of
technology and minimal physical presence. He talked about how the heavy reliance on drones
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was a major aspect of Hillary Clinton’s ‘smart power’ strategy around the world and how in
reality her tactics still constitute hard powers.76 Interestingly, there is evidence to demonstrate
that she does comprehend what a smart power actually constitutes, as she defined it in a 2009
speech given to Senate Foreign Relations Committee as “the full range of tools at our disposal:
diplomatic, economic, military, political, and cultural.”77
This paper can now use this new definition of smart power to analyze how and why the Belt
and Road Initiative should be seen as a smart power. To do this we can analyze speeches by
President Xi as well as other Chinese government representatives. First, the definition states that
initiatives must be an “international power building initiative.” There are many ways to show
how China sees the BRI as an international project most notably quotes from President Xi’s
“Work Together to Build the Silk Road Economic Belt and The 21st Century Maritime Silk
Road.” Throughout this speech, President Xi regularly references international cooperation as an
important aspect of the BRI: “We should strengthen international cooperation on production
capacity and equipment manufacturing, and seize new development opportunities.”78 The next
part of this definition states that a smart power must “looks to bolster and create new institutions
aimed at expanding to resources.” We can also prove this through analyzing President Xi’s
speech in which he regularly refers to rebuilding the “Silk Road Economic Belt.”79 Furthermore,
President Xi references the building of the Asian Infrastructure Bank, an institution in the literal
sense, as an important part of the BRI’s plan.80 Finally, we can address the last part: “the
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inclusion and utilization of other states’ resources.” In a speech by Wang Yi, China’s foreign
ministry, he reiterates China’s front-stage policy of wanting to create “a new type of
international relations featuring win-win cooperation.”81 President Xi has also attested that over
100 countries have “supported and got[ten] involved in” the BRI.82
Throughout the interviews performed for this paper, there was a wide range of views
regarding the actual implementation of President Xi’s so called “win-win” diplomacy.83 Many
articles, such as one by The Interpreter titled “Belt and Road: colonialism with Chinese
characteristics,” have proposed a growing worry that the BRI is imitating many aspects of past
western imperialism.84 A major aspect furthering some individuals worry is debt trap diplomacy,
as was discussed earlier in the literature review. Prasad, perhaps showing the most concern with
the potential negative effects of the BRI, talks about the relationships China is creating as
“complicated” and describes the use of debt and debt forgiveness as a “strategy.”85 She believes,
specifically pointing to the example of China taking over a port in return for unpaid debt in Sri
Lanka, that “debt diplomacy [may end up] entrapping some countries rather than empowering
them.”86 In another interview, Shankar shows a similar, if perhaps marginally smaller, worry
over the future of the BRI. He proposes the question:
“What happens once [China] builds that infrastructure, road, railroad, or parliament building?
Do the Chinese pick up and leave, because that’s what I’m wondering, what the kind of long-
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term engagement looks like and if it is viewed in those countries as exploitative or as being
stuck in a debt trap?”87
He believes that it is too early to decide whether these loans will be viewed as imperial,
specifically for actions such as Chinese importation of labor into other states and taking over of
land such as in Sri Lanka, or potentially as the next Marshal plan.88 Lastly, in discussion with
Balogun, the possibility of success for global south nation was more important than the potential
for imperialism. He believes, similar to the message pushed by Were,89 that joining the BRI
increases global south nations’ “agency.”90 He also pointed to the messaging given by Chinese
officials throughout speeches as proof of their commitment towards members of the BRI.91
Overall, it seemed to me that Balogun had a more positive outlook, if still cautious, on states
joining the BRI than Prasad and Shankar. The perception and outlook of the BRI is immensely
important to China. As Prasad aptly points out: “the whole world is watching” and that states are
looking at events such as the leasing of the Sri Lankan port and questioning whether or not to
increase commitment to China’s initiative.92
The context from the previous section, most notably the new definition of smart power, is
helpful with answering this paper’s research questions. Focusing on question number 1: “Should
smart power strategies be known as stronger contemporary power building initiatives than hard
power strategies?” While hard power strategies have been utilized for thousands of years,
modern situations, especially due to nuances caused by evolutions such as state and non-state
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actors, may have caused these traditional methods of power to struggle in adaptation. To answer
this question I further relied upon the interview with Shankar and a lecture from Prasad. First,
this paper is going to focus on hard powers and their effectiveness in the modern day and age.
When asked, Shankar believed that “hard power resources in themselves have become less useful
in the contemporary context.”93 He attributes three aspects of modern international affairs to this
reasoning. Specifically for great powers, interacting with traditional methods of hard power, such
as physical invasions, are stamped down by the threat of the use of nuclear weapons.94
Shankar additionally believes that “economic interdependence” creates a situation where
“the prospect of war [is] much more damaging and much more costly.”95 Economic
interdependence has long been debated over whether or not it stops wars. For example, within
“Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations” by Dale Copeland, I
could not, however, find anything comparing it to hard powers decreasing usefulness. Because of
this connection, I believe Shankar has given an important and innovative insight in regards to
hard power in the 21st century. Lastly, Shankar discusses how interstate non-state actors also
create a complication of using hard powers within one’s own state, potentially on its own
civilians.96 With these factors taken into account, Shankar made a point of explicitly stating that
hard powers “have not become obsolete” and that “if you were fewer to push me on it, I would
still say that hard power is probably the most important kind of, um, indicator of power still.”97
However, this insight is followed by discussing the complicated combination of resources it
takes to for China’s BRI. Shankar notes that, while China may “believe that the way of building
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up soft power is to pump in money all over the world,” he actually see that as a hard power.98
This complicated narrative, however, is where I believe my new definition of smart power
thrives. Instead of looking at money as growing China’s soft power or hard power, what China is
doing is exchanging money for another resources: influence. Shankar’s discussion on money and
China, demonstrates why straight hard power initiatives are becoming outdated and being
transformed in smart power strategies. These strategies not only gain China influence but
simultaneously build China’s soft power, albeit on a smaller scale as issues with the debts and
internal struggles such as the Uighurs dampen this ability.
While Shankar may not disagree with Prasad, Prasad does have a slightly different take
on hard power. In a lecture, Prasad seemed to be pushing a similar narrative that hard powers are
here to stay, but traditional methods of its use are rapidly changing. Prasad splits military hard
power resources into two categories, conventional and unconventional weapons. Examples of
conventional weapons are manned planes, guns, and tanks; while examples of unconventional
weapons are drones and other cyber related tools such as skilled hackers.99 Prasad, with a large
focus on fighter jets, seems to point towards a continued desire from states for these planes as a
reason why hard power capabilities are perhaps less outdated than Shankar might believe them to
be. The newfound and increasing use of private military contractors (PMC) is also, to Prasad, an
example showing the transformation of traditional hard power resources. These PMC’s, which
she essentially describes as having no national loyalty and working simply to make money, can
enable countries to skirt around responsibility for more sensitive issues such as the discussions
regarding nuclear weapons that Shankar discussed.100 Prasad has also described, throughout this
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lecture and in other interviews, how states have begun increasing their reliance on the previously
discussed unconventional methods.101
Even with slight differences for Shankar and Prasad, their inputs create a clear path
demonstrating a degradation in the capacity for hard power resources to be used on a large scale
into the future. This does not mean that they necessarily see hard power as being less useful than
smart or soft power; for now, this issue seems to be at a tipping point. To specifically answer the
research question, from the information provided by Shankar and Prasad, smart power evidently
has more potential on the international field than ever before, especially with the increasing
difficulties conventional hard powers have throughout the world today.
The second research question, that is “how much does the US and China's current
international strategies for power rely on smart power vs hard or soft power initiatives,” more
specifically focuses on the US and China’s international strategies. However, I believe that, in
clarifying the US and Chinese strategies throughout this section can provide even more insight
into supporting the answer for research question #1. To address this question, I am going to
utilize a wide range of sources including interviews, newspapers, and speeches.
First, this paper will focus on what the US’s international power is actually based upon.
A hypothesis I had going into this research paper was that the US’s smart power capabilities
were undervalued, especially in comparison to its hard power resources. With the United States
defense spending reaching $714 billion in 2020,102 many such as Shankar,103 point to it as one of
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the most important, if not the most important, aspect of America’s international power. This
budget is larger than the next 10 countries combined, which is an incredible statistic to
contextualize.104 With this power the United States is able to have a tremendous amount of
influence throughout the world. In the South China sea, the US utilizes its navy “as a way of
showing the disputed waterway remains open to international use rather than exclusive Chinese
control.”105 In an interview, Wang Yi referred to the US Navy’s presence as a “provocative
action” that “breaches its [the US’s] longstanding commitment of not taking sides, and blatantly
interfere[ing] in the territorial disputes.”106 The US sees this differently. For the US, its “aircraft
carrier’s passage in the South China Sea was meant to counter Beijing’s vast claims over the
waters and signal to allies, such as the Philippines, that Washington was a ‘reliable and capable
treaty ally.’”107 The US has used its military power to spread its influence in places all over the
world and, even with President Biden creating stricter limits for methods such as drone strikes,
this is unlikely to change in the near future.108 Soft power, until recently, was considered one of
the US’s strengths around the world, especially, as Shankar points out during an interview, in
comparison to China. However, with the legacy of the Trump Administration and the country’s
poor response to the coronavirus pandemic, this has taken a drastic turn. As President Biden put
it in his 100-day speech to congress: America is now facing “a test of whether our democracy
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could survive.”109 Democracy and freedom have been major aspects of American soft power and
the fact that President Biden addresses the faults so clearly shows the extremity of the situation
facing the nation. In a faculty panel held by Skidmore College entitled “Aftershock: Global
Views of U.S. Democracy After Trump,” the focus was on looking towards the state of the
“perceptions of the United States from abroad and the notion of American exceptionalism.”110
Shankar and Prasad were present in this panel, along with Dym, a professor of history and the
director of Latin American and Latinx Studies, and Schneider, an assistant professor of
economics. Notable statements published in the college’s article regarding the event include:
“What happens in domestic politics in the United States has real-world implications for
the world and, for instance, how democracy is perceived - the credibility of something
like a democratic political system at the global level.”111 – Shankar
“Words really matter. The vocabulary that people, especially politicians, use has weight
in the world”112 – Dym
“What this translates to is a sense, in the long term, of the United States as an unreliable
partner. This is making countries in Europe, Australia, Japan, India, South Korea and
Singapore extremely nervous about long-term relationships and forcing them not only to
recalibrate their relationships with the United States but also to recalibrate their
relationships with other countries. In other words, they’re hedging their bets.”113 – Prasad
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From these particular quotes and other statements throughout the panel, it is evident that
American soft power is in question throughout the world. Early in the panel, Shankar noted how
this issue was “not necessarily caused by the Trump Administration but which was certainly
magnified and made more apparent to the world by it.”114 The evidence showing a large decrease
in American international soft power is rampant and evident not only by the interviews and
faculty panel, but also in international news coverage of the US.
These, soft and hard power, are the two most traditional ways of viewing American
power however I want to emphasize a much lesser discussed, third version: America’s smart
power. Most notably, I want to point out the UN and its many lesser recognized benefits to the
US. First and potentially most notably, the US’s position on the UN Security Council and
possession of veto powers. These powers, as laid out by the UN, enable the US to “use the veto
to defend their national interests, to uphold a tenet of their foreign policy or, in some cases, to
promote a single issue of particular importance to a state.”115 From this power the US can block
any measure going through the Security Council that effects itself or an ally. The US has used
the UN to legitimize wars such as the occupation of Iraq.116 There are many other instances,
however I believe it is best summarized by a CSIS report: “Today more than ever, the United
States’ national interests[…] are best served by the existence of a rule-based international
community. It is precisely this legitimacy of UN action that provides the United States with a
vital foreign policy tool at a time when our recent efforts at working multilaterally have
faltered.”117 While many do point to the UN as an important part of America’s toolbox, few
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describe it with the importance that I believe it deserves. Interestingly, as pointed out in the
interview with Prasad, many seem to relate the UN to the creation of American soft power.118
While I agree that the UN does create an immense amount of soft power, I would argue,
especially with this paper’s definition, that the UN enables the creation of new initiatives, laws,
and diplomatic relations that in actuality are more of a smart power.
Unfortunately for the US, due to issues such as the decade’s long neglect and the legacy
of the Trump administration, Shankar believes “the UN is struggling, as far as whether it's
terminal, I think for now it is.”119 With the increasing “democratic deficit” and the UN’s inability
to change and democratize itself, especially within the Security Council, Shankar calls into
question the existence of the UN to continue its history of being an effective tool for the world,
and in turn for the US. The deficit in America’s ability to create successful smart power
initiatives can be seen in President Biden’s most recent international summit on global warming
where a NYTimes podcast described its lackluster results as being due to “the world
really[…]not feel[ing] compelled to follow that U.S. lead in this case. The rest of the world is
exhausted of watching U.S. presidents come forward and say, we’re the leader in this.[…] We’re
going to join a big treaty— and then doing a 180 and pulling out of this.”120 For the US, smart
power is its “theoretical core” and is needed to maintain the US’s “contextual intelligence”.121
Nye defines contextual analysis as “the intuitive diagnostic skill to align your tactics with a
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strategy that fits a given context.”122 To Nye, this is a necessary aspect to be a successful leader
and is an ability the US has built to a uniquely high level.123 124 Post-pandemic the US’s
contextual analysis has failed, a smart power capability, which has therefore lead to the larger
failures we see for the US around the world.125 The lack of recognition, neglect, and now
decaying of what I would argue is the most important aspect of US power, contextual analysis, is
the main cause of the many failures the US is experiencing abroad.
Whether it be through hard, soft, or smart power initiatives, the US is struggling
throughout every aspect. Post-WWII, the US was seen as a dominating force throughout the
world, however since the second Bush administration, and frameworks such as ‘pre-emptive
wars’ or the Bush doctrine, institutions that the US has relied upon for influence have struggled
tremendously.126 In summary, the US still has a significant physical presence on the world
through hard powers, such as its military, however they are arguably becoming outdated.
Regarding soft power, the most recent administration has left the US with less than ever before.
And regarding smart power, the UN seems to be on its last leg and America’s ability to provide
itself with contextual analysis is at an all-time low.
Moving forward, this paper will discuss China and the types of power underlying its
international strategies, starting with a focus on soft power. For China, soft power has and
continues to be an elusive power. Shankar states that he believes China’s method of building soft
power is through “pumping money throughout the world.”127 He continued to point out how he
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actually sees money as a hard power resource, which I would also agree. Additionally, he
describes China’s level of soft power to the US as “not even close at this point.”128 One theory I
had was that China’s internal affairs, especially regarding human rights abuses and the genocide
of Uighurs in Xinjiang,129 would damper other states willingness to join new initiatives such as
the BRI. However, Shankar interprets this differently. Instead, he sees China’s external treatment
of other nations that are partners in the BRI as the main factor impacting states deciding whether
or not to join.130 In a very similar way to Prasad,131 he believes that events such as China taking
over a Sri Lankan port are more impactful: If states see other states “getting stuck in debt traps or
becoming dissatisfied with how Chinese are conducting themselves, those things will impact
how these countries are thinking.”132 However, I also set to look for answers regarding how
much China valued soft power. Prasad believes that “China is less concerned with soft power
and more concerned with smart powers.”133 Keeping this paper’s definition of smart power in
mind, this makes complete sense as it is not a vital piece of creating successful smart power
initiatives. With these statements in mind it becomes clearer that China is looking to expand the
outward image of the nation and not the internal one. China’s ability to support other nations is
much more important as it is the factor other states are analyzing when deciding to join its
initiatives. Internal issues for China, especially with its unrivaled ability to control narratives and
information regarding different abuses,134 are of much less concern as they do not impact other
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states decisions. China’s hard power resources are more thought out than its soft power
resources and have a larger impact. They are, however, also affected by the same challenges that
the US’s hard powers face, especially by economic interdependency. Differently than the US,
Shankar describes China as maintaining a more “base level of [military] hard power.”135 As
discussed, this is because China values less tangible hard assets, such as money and diplomatic
influence, over traditional or conventional assets. In-fact, in my Shankar and Prasad email, there
was an agreement that China’s soft power was not a power but a weakness.136
China is investing its relatively small amount of soft power and much of its hard power
assets into creating more smart powers. This can be seen from near constant speeches from
government officials and from the messages that are being pushed within them. For example, in
regards to the Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), Wang Yi said that “China constructively participated
in the whole process of negotiations[… with Chinese] launched highly effective cooperation,”
cooperation that the US may have been responsible for just a few years prior.137 In another
interview, Wang Yi heavily discusses China’s involvement with the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), an economic union with 10 Southeast Asian states, and their
involvement with the BRI.138 A search for “belt and road” on https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/, one of
China’s websites that house state representatives speeches, returned over 850 individual
documents mentioning it. The sheer number of resources, whether it be through diplomatic or
monetary initiatives, that China is putting into the creation of the BRI throughout the world is
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truly staggering. Wang Yi puts the direct investment at over $30 billion,139 with loans from the
AIIB reaching over $10 billion,140 and, according to the American Enterprise Institute, invested
or received contracts for more than $300 billion dollars into Sub-Saharan Africa alone.141
China’s main power of focus is smart power and almost every ounce of that focus is being
funneled into the expansion of its economy and worldwide influence through the Belt and Road
Initiative.

Limitations
While I was fortunate enough to have access to several professors to interview and receive
advice from, there were some limitations that could be remedied in future work. First, I lacked
direct access to politicians and was thus not able to further understand their back-stage
intentions. While I attempted to remedy this by evaluating speeches, the speeches often only
demonstrate front-stage attitudes. In my opinion, this was even more prominent in the case of
China which stringently controls the narrative not only of its official government releases, but
also its representatives throughout the world. Furthermore, if given additional time, I would have
liked to interview more representatives and professors from many of the global south nations,
especially those from nations that are participating in the BRI.
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Conclusion
This paper evolved to answer not only the research questions but also to provide a new and
more demystified definition of smart power: “An approach to international power building
initiatives that looks to bolster and create new institutions aimed at expanding access to
resources through the inclusion and utilization of other states and their own resources.” This
definition enabled a critique of Nye’s equal reliance of soft and hard power. Additionally, this
paper identifies an appropriate one-word descriptor of smart power as “manipulation.” This helps
comparatively with the one-word descriptors used for soft and hard powers.
After re-defining smart power, this paper provided information and sources to answer the
first research question: 1) Should smart power strategies be known as stronger power building
initiatives than hard power strategies? While it proved difficult to concretely answer this
question, I am confident in reporting two findings. First, smart power strategies have gone
relatively unnoticed for their impact. And second, smart power strategies are of equal influence
to hard power strategies. Additionally, because of this paper’s new definition of smart power,
specifically because of the lesser reliance on soft power for it, I do not see the comparing of
smart power strategies with soft power ones to be of importance as they do not easily substitute
each other.
The second research question, how much does the US and China's current international
strategies for power rely on smart power vs hard or soft power initiatives, was able to be
answered in a much more concrete manner. For China, with the evidence from interviews and
speeches, I concluded that China has put much of its plans for its development of worldwide
influence into smart powers. While China does maintain a large army, its traditional weapons
capability is much lesser than the US’s and instead, China is investing most of its resources in
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the BRI. As for the United States, its hard power is by far the largest in the world, however it is
also running into problems regarding its usefulness in a contemporary context. In regard to its
soft power, the legacy of the Trump Administration has revealed the decades of neglect that US
soft power has faced. Smart power, meanwhile, is an incredibly important aspect of the US’s
power. Contextual analysis from smart powers is not the “theoretical core,”142 as some of
academia puts it, but instead the actual core that enables proper use of its other powers. The US,
however, has not properly supported the many institutions, most notably the UN, that have made
its smart powers possible.
For the future, it is of little doubt that smart powers will continue to play an increasingly
important role. To preserve its hegemonic presence throughout the world, the US will need to not
only re-invest in its old institutions in a hope to save them but re-invest in new smart power
strategies to re-assert itself on an international scale. China, due to the Trump administration and
its incredibly ambitious BRI, have not only exposed the US as a currently unstable ally, but
enabled China to reposition as a global economic player that will rival the US’s initiatives post
WWII. Through its smart powers, China has a strong possibility, if not certainty, of over-taking
the United States on a world scale and replace the very written and unwritten rules of the
internationals relations.143

Future Work
While this paper has critiqued other academia for leaving out smart power due to its
ambiguity, there is another, more precise power that has also been left out: sharp power. Prasad
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defined Sharp power as one state using other states strengths against itself.144 This is clearly a
hard power but, similarly to smart power, is under-researched and under-discussed in academia.
Sharp power has an important part in further efforts to understand how states wield power in the
21st century.
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